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“...The police and government are playing a game of flag here. They say that it is [and] that it’s 
not okay so if you want to work in it you must do so secretly, but then people who have worked 
for years and years and years suddenly get arrested by the officers who had been turning a blind 
eye. The government doesn't do [anything] for this industry and doesn't change [anything].” 








Cannabis is one of Morocco’s top industries, and Morocco is one of the world’s top 
cannabis providers. However, the growth, sale, and consumption of cannabis is very much illegal 
under the current legislation. In 2016 a bill was proposed in parliament to partially legalize 
cannabis cultivation and was supported by both the Party of Authenticity and Modernity and the 
Istiqlal Party, though it ultimately failed centrally due to opposition from the Islamist Party. 
Within this study, I examine Morocco’s current relationship with its cannabis industry and the 
three central potential paths from this point. The first is a continuation of the current ambiguity; 
the second to legalize; and the third is to fully enforce the current laws, ending in elimination of 
the industry - each of these paths would have immense impacts on Morocco, both economically 
and socially. I obtained my research through interviews with individuals in Chefchaouen (a city 
internationally known for its cannabis sale) and several government figures who had pushed for 
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After a proposed and ultimately tabled bill, decisions on cannabis in Morocco will remain 
inconclusive. The cannabis industry is one of great importance and profit in Morocco, 
particularly within the Northern Rif region. However, since the crop’s introduction to the country 
in the 16th century, its role and legality have never been crystal clear. Through pardons, bribery, 
inhospitable lands, and increasing unemployment, the industry has survived, as have the 
industry’s workers. However, mere survival for the approximate 760,000 Moroccans dependent 
on this industry is unacceptable (Blickman, 2017). It is my belief that a decision needs to be 
reached, and putting such a decision off any longer will only worsen the situation. Though the 
legalization proposed in 2016 did not pass, two of the three main political parties in Morocco are 
still very much for it, and it seems likely it will continue to be proposed in coming parliaments. 
Thus, it seems Morocco has three central choices - to legalize, to eliminate, or to allow the 
cannabis industry to continue as is.  
For purposes of this study, I will be using pseudonyms for most of my interviewees with 
names pulled from the top five most common Moroccan names, both male and female. Also, 
though Morocco is mostly ranked in reference to their cannabis resin production, or hashish, kif 
is also produced and distributed. Within this paper, I have chosen to refer to the industry as a 
whole using the term cannabis. If hashish, resin, or kif are used I am referring to the 
subcategories. With Moroccan production, there are certain strands of hashish and kif which will 





The Rif region of Morocco has been financially dependent on the growing and selling of 
cannabis since the 1400’s, as it’s one of few crops able to flourish in the region’s inhospitable 
climate. However, the drug has been strictly prohibited in Morocco since independence in 1956. 
Additionally, under the former King Hassan II, a pardon of sorts was placed on the town of 
Kitama stating that production is allowed solely within the agricultural stage - what this means 
for selling and distributing is unclear. It is currently prospected that the cannabis industry 
contributes 15-20% of Morocco’s total GDP, making up about 80% of the country’s informal 
sector. The elaborate underground system that has been set up both within Morocco and between 
Morocco and Spain (and through the rest of Europe) reaps immense financial benefits for all 
involved. If legalized, the industry could then be taxable, though these underground connections 
would then be cut off and the central, potentially sole, buyers of Moroccan hashish would come 
from pharmaceutical companies, willing to pay much less. However, there also exists a great 
discrepancy in the sharing of profit - it is believed that the growers receive a mere 20% of initial 
profits, while those who process and sell receive 80%.  
Also relevant is a brief overview of Morocco’s current political set up. There are three 
political parties relevant to the discussion of legalization - these are also the three major parties 
within parliament: the PJD (the central Islamist party), the Authenticity and Modernity Party 
(PAM), and the Istiqlal or Independence Party (nationalists). The PJD, or the Justice and 
Development Party, “is an Islamist conservative democrat party crucially supporting Moroccan 
monarchy. PJD disavows violence, terrorism and seeks to defend Morocco’s Islamic identity 
through legislative means” (​Organizations: Morocco: Justice and Development Party PJD, 2016​). 
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As this party is based in Islam, and cannabis is considered haram, it adamantly opposes pushes 
for legalization. The PAM, or Authenticity and Modernity Party, was founded in 2008 to offer a 
perspective different from the PJD. Much of their efforts work towards human rights, and are 
also often discussed as a close ally for the king, a group to pull popularity from the PJD to better 
disperse power. Lastly, the Istiqlal party has played a dominant role since the initial post 
independence Moroccan government. It is a conservative monarchist party, and Morocco’s 
oldest political party. In both the 2015 and 2016 elections (for the 2016 and 2017 calendar year), 
PJD was elected to most seats, followed by the PAM and then the Istiqlal. In 2015, PJD won 174 
seats, PAM 132 seats, and Istiqlal 119 seats (Sadiqi, 2015). In 2016, things shifted slightly but 
had a similar outcome - PJD currently has 125 seats, PAM with 102 seats, and Istiqlal with 46 
(​El Amraoui, 2016)​.  
 
Literature Review: 
In an article posted by Moroccan World News, the “Maroc Cannabis 2016” movement 
was discussed, and its hopes to legalize the production of cannabis by the end of 2016, thus 
making it a taxable industry. As stated in Agora Vox, “​Two bills were tabled by two opposition 
political parties: the Istiqlal party and the PAM (Authenticity and Modernity Party) to demand  
the legalization of the cultivation of cannabis​ for "therapeutic and industrial purposes and to 
solicit the Amnesty for the 48,000 farmers who live in semi-clandestine conditions in the north 
of the country” (Blickman, 2017). ​Obviously, the movement did not reach its goal. However, it 
was an important step in increasing the conversation. Perhaps most important to this 
conversation, though, is the history of the Rif region - both before, during and after colonization.  
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The rif region, or, more specifically, everything north of the Sebu River, was given to 
Spain as a protectorate by Britain and France, while the middle region of Morocco was given to 
France. Given the wealth of the two countries, and the wealth of the claimed land, great 
economic disparities were furthered until independence was acquired in 1956. After which began 
the Years of Lead, a period of gross state misconduct and crime, much of which was committed 
in the north (Rif, 1998). Given the mountainous terrain of the Rif region, and given Morocco’s 
history with mountainous uprisings, the north was largely disregarded, mistreated, and 
undervalued as a part of Morocco. Additionally, the “French” part of Morocco contains the 
nation’s main cities and capital, and as such a natural separation occurred through cultural 
differences introduced during colonization. In conclusion, the north was largely left to defend for 
itself - and to create what industries it could, given its impoverished situation and difficult 
landscape. One of the few crops that was able to grow was cannabis. The other industry was 
smuggling goods to and from Morocco and Spain. Given that both of these industries are illegal, 
a large portion of northerners also attempt to emigrate, either legally or illegally. If the 
production of marijuana were legalized, there is potential that northern individuals could socially 
benefit immensely.  
In a statement released by Morocco’s Ministry of Health in 2016, in support of the 
Morocco Cannabis 2016 bill, they stated “cannabis production is undoubtedly an 
income-generating activity. Legalizing its production and consumption will contribute to the 
evolution of Moroccan GDP by more than 4.5 points per year, to equal the global superpowers 
such as the US and Burkina Faso” (Krauska, 2016). The 2015 real GDP growth rates shows 
Morocco’s growth rate at a 4.9, which would put Morocco at a whopping 9.4 growth rate if 
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marijuana were legalized (which would put Morocco tied for second greatest GDP growth 
according to 2015 statistics) (The World Bank: Morocco, 2017). However, the official numbers 
differ greatly from the prospected ones. 
As stated by the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, it is 
currently prospected that the buying and selling of Moroccan hashish is a $40 billion dollar 
industry (U.S., U.S. State Department). Morocco is the top provider of the world’s hashish 
(Cannabis: World Drug Report 2016). As aforementioned, the cannabis industry currently makes 
up 15-20% of the nation’s GDP. Though it cannot be known exactly what the impact of 
legalization would be, the regulation of the growers, sellers, and buyers would eliminate nearly 
all of the industry’s current actors, forcing the market to start anew through legal connections, 
mainly dealing with pharmaceutical companies. This would, again prospected, cut the market in 
half - thus contributing to 7-10% of Morocco’s GDP - a significant fall. 
Legalization is slowly and surely becoming yet another phenomenon of globalization. As 
stated in the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “In the past four years, four 
jurisdictions in the United States and Uruguay have passed laws to allow the production, 
distribution and sale of cannabis for nonmedical purposes (i.e. for recreational use), which is 
contrary to the spirit of the international drug control conventions” (Cannabis, 2016). This is in 
addition to those that have already established legal procedures, or at least decriminalization, for 
the cannabis industry. Colombia, Canada, Czech Republic, Uruguay, Spain, United States, 
Portugal, Netherlands, Switzerland and Romania make up the current list of countries with legal, 
or at least partially legal, marijuana use and distribution. Morocco’s case, however, differs 
greatly from all of these. “Reports from Member States on source countries for cannabis resin 
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during the period 2009-2014 suggest that the world’s largest producer of cannabis resin 
continues to be Morocco” - no other top producer has gone through legalization, and as such that 
transformation is an unknown process. Uruguay and United States are the two countries closely 
examined in the 2016 UNODC report, and though the U.S. is a producer with a past, almost all is 
consumed within the country. In Uruguay, “There was no prior regulation for the use of cannabis 
for medical purposes (although the possession of cannabis was not a criminal offense), nor was 
there significant illicit cannabis production”. Morocco is different for a multitude of reasons - its 
lack of local consumption being one of them. “The subregion in which the largest amount of 
cannabis resin was seized in 2014 was again Western and Central Europe, accounting for 40 per 
cent of the global seizures of cannabis resin (Spain alone accounted for 26 per cent of the world 
total); 32 per cent of the world total was accounted for by countries in North Africa (mainly 
Morocco and Algeria) and 25 per cent was accounted for by countries in the Near and Middle 
East (mainly Pakistan, followed by the Islamic Republic of Iran and Afghanistan)”. Morocco’s 
30-some percent alone is quite impressive, but Morocco is likely also responsible for much of 
Europe’s 40%, as Morocco is the only large producer with access to / a relationship with Europe 
- “As in previous years, cannabis resin from Morocco was mainly smuggled to Europe and other 
countries in North Africa, while cannabis resin produced in Afghanistan continued to be 
smuggled to neighboring countries, particularly Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran”. 
Also relevant to the discussion is the unlikelihood of such legalization ever occurring, as 
another difference between Morocco and other countries working towards legalization is its 
status as an Islamic State. In Parliament, there are currently two central parties pushing 
adamantly for legalization, and another pushing adamantly against. For legalization is the 
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Authenticity and Modernity Party and the Istiqlal Party, who voted for a legalization bill 
proposed in 2016. Against is the Islamic Party, unwilling to even discuss the prospect due to the 
consumption of drugs being considered haram, or forbidden, under Islam. There is a movement 
at the moment, which started in 2007, to replace the hashish in the Rif region with alternative 
crops. The European Union is currently giving Morocco 50 million Euro annually to complete 
this task. However, the movement has thus far largely failed. The money in growing and selling 
other crops does not come close to the money in hashish, and it also does not supply all 
individuals further down the line with alternative work. Growers are the only one included in 
such a program, and it makes little financial sense for them to commit to it.  
Morocco did not pass the bill for legalization, and as such no real decision has been 
reached on how to proceed. Though also factoring in social impacts, the main purpose of this 
study is to compare the economic impact of legalization, complete enforcement of current laws, 
or maintaining the complicated current state of illegal but acknowledged production/distribution. 
I have yet to come upon a study that fully explores Morocco’s options, and emphasizes the 
importance of reaching and enforcing a decision. Tom Blickman of the Transnational Institute 
published a study “Cannabis and Morocco” in March of this year,  which ​I will highlight 
throughout my paper​. However, the purpose of the Transnational Institute's study is mainly to 
explain the industry’s historical roots, and the impact that reducing cannabis would have on the 
region. If interested in further reading, I highly suggest his study for full historical context. The 
study that follows, however, takes the form of a comparative analysis - analyzing the economic 
and social impact of legalization, elimination, or continuation - focusing only on impacts on 





Before starting this study, I assumed legalization was the clear solution to Morocco’s 
cannabis industry. I also assumed all growers, given the in discrepancies in wages, would also be 
for legalization. Sellers, due to their potential removal from the industry, would likely be against 
legalization and I anticipated the Rif region on the whole would be for legalization. However, I 
soon realized how wrong I was. The situation is far from simple, and as a foreigner coming in I 
felt I saw a clear solution. Morocco’s position as a top-producing, Islamic state is one that cannot 
be oversimplified, and I did my best to avoid any generalizations in this study. However, that 
being said, given my limits on time and resources I was only able to interview a select number of 
individuals and the conclusions I draw are based off of these conversations and readings and in 
no means reflect beliefs of all Moroccans or all those involved in the industry - I merely hope to 
highlight a few perspectives and explain the potential paths as I have grown to understand them.  
 
Methodology: 
For this study, I lived in the old medina of Chefchaouen for two and half weeks as it’s 
commonly referred to as the hub of Morocco’s cannabis industry. I planned on interviewing two 
growers and two sellers during my time there - a goal that both my advisor and I found 
reasonable. I spent my first week getting to know the city and a few of its people, openly 
discussing my research with those who asked. When I told my friend Imane of my interview 
goals, she offered to call her friends working in the mountains. However, they did not feel safe 
talking with me even anonymously over the phone out of fear of being reported. Imane explained 
to me that recently quite a few sellers had been arrested after being interviewed by a reporter, 
and nobody was willing to risk exposure. I pursued other growers and sellers through another 
12 
 
friend with the same result. At this point, I had only a week left in Chefchaouen. I soon realized, 
however, most of the industry’s workings were fairly common knowledge - my interviewee 
Hamza said about 70% of the people he knows in the region work in the industry, and all others 
agreed it was definitely the majority of their friends and family. I decided, rather than waste 
more time, to interview those I had met during my time in Chefchaouen. I was very aware of my 
being a foreigner asking sensitive questions in an ultimately very vulnerable population, and in 
the end felt grateful I was able to interview anyone at all, that my friends and acquaintances 
trusted me enough to openly discuss the situation, as well as their disgruntlement with the 
government’s behavior and approaches.  
After my time in Chefchaouen, I hoped to interview members of the relevant political 
parties - centrally the Party of Authenticity and Modernity (PAM) and the Istiqlal Party. Though 
many were dubious, I initially had great luck. Through a connection a Center for Cross-Cultural 
Learning, I obtained the number of an Istiqlal Party member. After a bit of phone tag, he called 
and asked me to come to the Istiqlal headquarters. I went immediately, and was graciously 
welcomed. As I sat down and asked if it was okay I take notes, he clarified that this was not an 
interview - merely a meeting to put me in touch with others. He then called a higher-up Istiqlal 
Party member and two PAM members, asking if they were willing to meet with me. They all 
agreed. After receiving their information, I thanked Omar and left. I asked that he send me the 
official bill that had been tabled last year, and he agreed. He also said I should call him Monday 
to set up the Istiqlal interview. Monday came and I called, but he did not answer. I then called 
the PAM representative, who offered to meet with me that evening. After quite a bit of 
confusion, and several taxi rides later, we met at a coffee shop near the PAM headquarters and I 
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again found myself in not an interview, but a meeting. Al Haiba, the PAM representative, asked 
that I come into headquarters the following morning to receive an official presentation of the 
situation in the Rif and be given all relevant documents, including the bill. I called repeatedly the 
next day, all to no avail. That evening I received an apology from Al Haiba, though no word of 
rescheduling. I asked if perhaps the following day might work, and when that didn’t earn a 
response, asked if I could just be sent said documents. He agreed. I also reached out to Omar 
from the Istiqlal Party again, and eventually made the same request. I was never sent any 
documents, though was given permission to use our brief conversations in my final paper.  
I’m still not exactly sure what to make of these interactions. Perhaps they, too, felt unsafe 
discussing such sensitive matters with an outsider - but why then with the front? Perhaps they 
thought initially I was a reporter rather than a student, and upon realizing my lack of importance 
decided against wasting the energy and time. My inability to get a copy of the bill, though, I 
don’t understand. It seems to me that such a document would be public property, and yet I have 
been unable to locate it. It also seems to me that with so many Moroccans being so affected by 
such legislation, more communication and transparency would exist. Regardless, I was 
ultimately immensely disappointed in my inability to conduct a full interview, official or 
unofficial, with a representative from either party. 
The following are those I interviewed through the ISP period, the first four using pseudonyms: 
Youssef:​ Male, 32, born and raised in Chefchaouen region, runs shop,  
Hamza:​ Male, 24, born and raised in Chefchaouen, runs hostel 
Salma:​ Female, 21, born and raised in Chefchaouen region, student, sister of cannabis farmers 
Imane:​ Female, 22, born and raised in Chefchaouen, runs hostel 
Al Haiba:​ Male, member of the Party of Authenticity and Modernity 





I will separate my findings into two central categories; economic and social impacts, and 
within those focus on the three central options for the cannabis industry; continuation, 
legalization, and elimination. As aforementioned, my findings are based on interviews and 
research and by no means cover all factors or results - merely my findings during my month long 
study.  
Economic Analysis: Continuation 
Morocco’s economy has seen steady growth over the last fifty years, and was recently 
ranked the most competitive North African economy (Africa Competitiveness Report, 2017​)​. Its 
labor force, last measured in 20​16, is made up of 12.23 million individuals split up over three 
main categories - agriculture, industry, and services. As stated in the CIA World Factbook, 
agriculture consists of farming, fishing, and forestry. Industry consists mining, manufacturing, 
energy production, and construction. Services include government activities, communications, 
transportation, finance, and all other economic activities that do not produce material goods. By 
this definition, the cannabis industry contributes both to agriculture and industry, though its 
numbers normally contribute to Morocco’s informal economy, industries outside of state control. 
The informal economy is difficult to study, as its positions are rarely taxed or recorded, but 
Morocco’s is currently estimated around 50 billion dollars, and currently contributes to 43% of 
Morocco’s official GDP (Mama & ​Othmane, 2016​). Morocco’s cannabis industry is estimated to 
make up the vast majority of the informal economy, and contributes between 30 and 40 billion 
dollars, meaning it alone makes up nearly 30% of the official GDP. The U.S. state department 
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states the industry is ​“potentially equivalent to as much as 23 percent of Morocco’s $100 billion 
GDP once processed into hashish”​, but regardless of the exact number, it is clearly a massive 
contributor.  
This leads us to the first option - continuation. Provided the environmental factors remain 
constant, the industry would continue its impressive contribution under the guise of informal 
economy. On a smaller scale, however, the cannabis market is suffering. The industry, after its 
initial boom, has flooded with both growers and sellers causing the market value to plummet. 
With the supply increasing and the demand remaining constant, price fell and fell fast. In an 
interview with Salma, a 21-year-old student in Chefchaouen with two brothers currently working 
as growers, she described the current efforts to get out of the industry - the money in it is far 
from what it used to be, and the risk feels ever increasing. The kif and hashish now sold in the 
region is so cheap and available, it has lost nearly all value. Salma stated, based on her and her 
brothers’ knowledge of the industry, that a gram of Moroccan kif used to go for around 15 
dirhams, and its current street price is a mere 2.5 dirhams. The Pakistan and Marijuana strains, 
newer to the region and more valuable, have fallen from 20 to 6 or 7 dirhams. This is an 84% and 
68% decrease in value, respectively. Another interviewee, Youssef, 32, born and raised in the Rif 
region with majority of his friends and family working in the industry, gave similar prices for a 
then and now comparison. He also estimated that the height of the industry took place in the 
1970’s and 80’s, confirmed by several authors, meaning that aforementioned fall in prices took 
place over the course of approximately 40 years. Assuming the regression was linear, that leaves 
us with a 2.1% and 1.7% annual loss in value. However, this decrease is not seen on the national 
scale, as the number of cannabis workers has curiously continued to increase, meaning the net 
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total continues to rise. However, if Salma’s prediction is correct, and there’s soon to be a general 
shift from the less and less lucrative yet increasingly risky business of cannabis, there is a chance 
this supply and demand will shift and higher prices will return. However, these small scale prices 
only make up for about 10% of the cannabis produced, for 90% of the product is exported to 
surrounding nations, centrally Spain from which it continues on through much of Europe (in 
2003, it was estimated that 70% of Europe’s hashish came from Morocco - a number that’s 
safely assumed to have increased since as Morocco is now ranked the world’s #1 supplier of 
cannabis) (​Cannabis: World Drug Report, 2016)​. These transactions differ as they are 
international and wholesale, and knowledge on prices is largely unavailable. It is known, 
however, that about 180,000 tons of cannabis cross Spain’s border every year, and the received 
payment makes up the vast majority of this 40 billion dollar industry. 
So, the current industry is profitable for the nation, and will likely continue to be 
profitable. The European Union opposes Morocco’s recent legalization legislation, potentially 
because of their reliance on these extensive underground connections. Additionally, to further 
complicate the matter, Morocco has been received mass sums of money (estimated at 50 million 
annually) for an alternate crop project, an effort to get cannabis farmers to switch to other crops. 
This has evidently included updating irrigation systems, fertilizer, education, yet out of all of my 
interactions while in Chefchaouen, not a single individual had even heard of such a movement, 
let alone know anyone who had participated. Movements like this have been going on since the 
1990’s without any noticeable decline in cannabis production. In an evaluation of the EU’s 
development and poverty reduction programmes, one representative remarked that  “The only 
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way to eradicate cannabis, is to convince the Europeans to smoke carrots”. While there’s 
demand, there will be supply (Blickman, 2017).  
Economic Analysis: Legalization  1
The projected numbers for legalization are impressive - but it’s hard to know how 
accurately the current Cannabis Industry contributions are being measured. A representative of 
the Ministry of Health stated ​“legalizing its production and consumption will contribute to the 
Moroccan GDP by more than 4.5 percentage points per year” (Krauska, 2016).  However, it’s 
unclear if that statistic is comparing no cannabis industry to a legalized one, or the current 
industry to a legalized one. The regulation and taxation would undoubtedly benefit Morocco’s 
economy and people, but perhaps the greatest benefit would be the surfacing of the industry. In 
my opinion, I feel much of the push for legalization comes from the Moroccan government 
yearning for validity. 20-30% of the GDP stemming from an illegal market is not a statistic often 
bragged about, and the desire to achieve international credibility and respect has heavily 
influenced the majority of King Mohammed VI’s reign. From my perspective, the legalization 
and regulation of such a major industry - despite the net GDP loss - could potentially bring in 
new international partnerships, thus expanding Morocco’s numerous, various industries.  
Economic Analysis: Elimination 
A complete elimination of the cannabis industry would leave Morocco’s economy and 
people in a rather dire situation. With 760,000 Moroccans dependent on the income cannabis 
provides, a replacement of the industry is necessary to prevent a soaring unemployment rates. 
The GDP would fall from 100.59 to 70.42 billion, a number we haven’t seen in the past decade. 




The introduction of a new industry, however, could make up much of the loss as well as provide 
financial stability for the 48,000 growers currently receiving margins of what they deserve. What 
this new industry would provide, however, I am not in a position to say. The land in the Rif 
region is and always has been incapable of producing crops other than cannabis, and proposed 
solutions such as the European Union’s alternate cultivation project will provide neither jobs nor 
significant GDP contribution. Both Morocco’s government and its growers will not turn away 
from the cannabis industry until another more profitable alternative is thought of. 
The need for this new industry was emphasized by all those I interviewed in 
Chefchaouen. They demanded factories and jobs, and if not that then at least some sort of 
welfare system to ensure those that have long suffered in the north do not again grow neglected. 
However, the issue is cyclical as the government does not (and assumedly cannot) currently 
provide welfare, so how could they after losing an industry as central as cannabis? To this 
question, I have no solution - though the situation demands one.  
Social Analysis: Continuation 
The inability to continue as is was unanimous from all of my interviews. The conditions 
of those working in the industry - primarily the growers - are inhumane and in need of immediate 
attention. As stated in the study’s opening quote, “people who have worked years and years and 
years [in the industry] and then the cops came and they had to give everything they had to avoid 
prison — cops here if they find just small pieces in bag or pocket then you will go to prison”. 
Bribery, blackmail, and threats from officials in the Rif region are plaguing growers and this 
“gray area” of acceptability is not working. In the interview with Youssef, he emphasized this 
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going on to say the current predicament is quickly headed towards open aggression and potential 
violence between the inhabitants of the Rif region and all government officials.  
Furthermore, growers receive next to nothing for the product, all of the profit coming and 
remaining later down the line - it’s projected the growers receive approximately 20% of profit, 
though in reality it seems to be much less, receiving an estimated 1 dirham per gram. One of my 
interviewees, Hamza, explained this as due to the greater risk sellers face with their international 
interactions. However, it is in fact those interactions that provide both security and wealth, 
leaving the growers to defend for themselves against the random crackdowns, which have 
repeatedly left growers and their families with nothing. 
Social Analysis: Legalization 
Socially, legalization seems to be the easy answer. Though profits would be lost, the 
market would be regulated and growers would at last receive their fair share. The threat of 
exposure and arrest would no longer loom over those 48,000 individuals, and those currently 
incarcerated would be free. It would cleanse the industry of its human rights violations, and 
allow it continue and prosper as the global phenomenon of legalization continues. Though it 
would cause an economic hit, the social benefits cannot be ignored. It would, however, cut all 
individuals from the industry apart from the farmers. Sellers and the elaborate underground 
connections that have been formed over centuries would be lost, and the north’s already alarming 
unemployment would increase.  
Both the Party of Authenticity and Modernity and the Istiqlal Party seem to believe the 
social good will outweigh the economic bad - though as aforementioned, it’s unclear just how 
much either has analyzed the exact economic impact. In an interview with P.A.M. member Al 
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Haiba, he stated that PAM is talking about “issues about hashish, and [PAM’s] envisioning 
economic and humanity. [At the moment, there is] inhumane practicing, growing, selling and 
purchasing internationally”, then going on to state that the two local parties involved, growers 
and sellers, are not in the same situation, and it’s up to the government to provide assistance to 
those in the lesser position. By legalizing, the market and all its secrets is suddenly surfaced, 
again allowing full regulation and taxation. The system hasn’t been working without government 
interference, and things aren’t likely to change.  
Social Analysis: Elimination 
Much to my surprise, the vast majority of those interviewed in Chefchaouen called for a 
total elimination and replacement of the industry. In all of their minds, and in all reality, 
legalization seems incomprehensible for Morocco. Those working in the industry are not seeing 
the expected profit, and it’s no longer worth the risk. Back in the 70’s and 80’s, individuals were 
getting rich. But, as any economic boom, the market flooded and the financial gain is now 
negligible. Legally, Morocco has already eliminated the industry - but they continue to turn a 
blind eye as long as the contribution to their GDP remains and those in the region are compliant. 
The industry will not survive, and most do not feel it’s worth saving. Jobs are what are and 
always have been sought after - a chance to succeed. Salma, when asked what she would do if 
she were in charge of the future of the cannabis industry, stated that  
I will search and do anything to make every person switch from hashish to a different 
industry, end hashish altogether. Most people now are suffering from it - getting tired 
from working in it and are losing money from cops and the people, losing energy. 
Change would be welcome. Families are just trying to support themselves. The families 
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in the region all work - the small ones, the old ones, the big ones - from February to May 
to sell it in June and then they still don’t get enough money to support themselves.  
The cannabis industry perhaps once worked, but it isn’t now and from my experience the entire 
region is exhausted of this never ending game of flag. Elimination is what the people want, but it 





Morocco’s cannabis industry has been a significant part of the country’s economy and 
social makeup for centuries, but can no longer continue in the informal, underground manner it 
historically has. The people of the Rif region are growing understandably restless, and the 
inequalities within the industry will not persist without resistance, without the government 
implementing change. I walk away from this study without a clear solution - whether elimination 
or legalization, I do not know. Continuation, however, is not an answer. As parliament disputes, 
those 48,000 growers are living impoverished and threatened. The discrepancy in the desire for 
legalization between the people and the government surprised me - it seems the Party of 
Authenticity and Modernity and the Istiqlal Party rather save what they can of the current 
industry, rather than shut it down. But either way, jobs in the north are needed in a very real way 
- jobs that are not being supplied. Legalization would be great - supply a safe, steady income for 
many Moroccans. However, it would also remove all those further down the assembly line - all 
sellers and processors will be out of work - elimination, obviously, would put all out of work. 
This may appear to present continuation as the most sensible path regarding employment, but 
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now too jobs are needed and not available. Whatever Morocco’s ultimate decision may be, 
employment opportunities must come out of it. From all of the young Moroccans I interviewed 
in the Chefchaouen region, all lamented about their lack of opportunities, that they should be 
deciding between real career options, not between unemployment and illegal employment. 
Salma, at the end of her interview, sighed and said “I want to leave Morocco. All people dream 
of leaving, because a successful life is not an option here”. Those in the Rif region do not need to 
emigrate - and they should not have to choose between that and working in illegal industries. 
Whatever Morocco’s decision in the end, jobs are a required result both for the economy and 
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